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RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
A CRITICISM OF WYOMING'S HABITUAL CRIMINAL ACT
In Waxier v. State' the Wyoming Supreme Court held that there was
no error in the conviction of the defendant on an information containing
counts under the Wyoming Habitual Criminal Act.2 One of the defendant's specifications of error was that it was prejudicial to the defendant,
in the eyes of the jury, for the court to allow evidence of his prior felony
convictions to be admitted during the same time he was being tried for
the principal offense. Justice Blume, in a concurring opinion, stated that
the fairness of this procedure may well be questioned, citing a former
opinion written by him in which he said, "There can be no question of
doubt, nor is it of trivial moment, that an accused is prejudiced in the
minds of the jury, when evidence appears against him which would indicate
habitual criminality." 3 It would seem that the sentence imposed in the
Waxier case was unduly harsh, because the defendant was given the serious
punishment of a life sentence in the state penitentiary for the offense of
cashing a forty dollar bad check; but the fact that the jury found that he
had been previously convicted of similar offenses in other states placed him
within the scope of the Wyoming Habitual Criminal Act, and the court
had no alternative but to sentence him for life as mandatorily prescribed
by the Act.
Wyoming, in the Waxier case, followed the majority4 of the courts in
holding that it was not error to admit evidence of prior convictions along
with evidence of the principal crime in a proceeding under a habitual
criminal statute. However, there seems to be an inconsistency in American
law on this point, because the majority of American courts also hold that in
cases other than proceedings under habitual criminal statutes, it is reversible error to allow evidence of defendant's prior convictions to go before
a jury or even comment to be made in reference thereto except to show
motive or to impeach the defendant's credibility.5 The courts rationalize
this exception to a long followed rule of evidence by saying that habitual
criminality is a status, not a crime, and that the admission of prior convictions is not prejudicial because this does not constitute a distinct charge
of crime, but only goes to the punishment of the criminal.6 Also they
say that the allegation of prior convictions should appear in the indictment
or information so that the defendant will have notice that this will be
used against him on the trial. 7 The prejudice which would result when
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67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514 (1950).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 secs. 9-109, 9-110, 9-111.
Perue v. State, 43 Wyo. 322, 2 P.2d 1072 (1931).
58 A.L.R. 20 et. seq. Excepted are Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland,
North Carolina and South Carolina.
20 Am. Jur. 287 sec. 309 and cases cited therein.
25 Am. Jur. 270 sec. 23 and cases cited therein.
42 C.JS. 1057 sec. 145 and cases cited therein.
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this indictment is read is obvious, but Wyoming's Habitual Criminal Act
and an earlier decision make this notice requirement mandatory.8
In 1929, when the first Habitual Criminal Act in the United States
was passed in New York,9 it was thought that this law would serve the
purposes of thwarting the rise of repeated crime after World War I, and
of protecting the public from the repeated offender. Practically all the
states have followed New York's lead and have passed Habitual Criminal
Acts to help solve the problem. 10 However, as noted, the prejudicial procedural and mandatory sentencing aspects 'of typical acts have given rise
to new problems.
It cannot be doubted that the evidence of prior convictions is actually
prejudicial in the eyes of the jury and that the evidence of previous criminality actually does tend to prove the defendant guilty of the principal
crime in the procedure followed under the typical Habitual Criminal Act,
such as Wyoming's. Several jurisdictions have recognized the unfairness
resulting from such a procedure, and have authorized, either by decision"
or statute, 12 a separate procedure to be followed in habitual criminal proceedings. This procedure is to divide the indictment or information into
two parts, the first part alleging the principal crime, and the latter part
alleging the former convictions. The entire indictment is then read to
the defendant and his plea is taken in the jury's absence. The jury is
then impanelled and sworn, and the trial goes forth for the principal crime,
there being no reference made to the prior convictions. When the jury
retires, they have before them only the first part of the indictment. If
they return a verdict of guiltly, the second part of the indictment is then
read to them, and evidence of the prior convictions is brought forth. At
the conclusion of this evidence, the jury retires and finds on this issue.
If the defendant is found guilty as charged in the second part of the indictment, he is sentenced according to the habitual criminal statute. This
procedure is obviously much fairer to the defendant in that it insures that
the defendant's previous record of criminality does not influence the finding of his guilt of the principal crime. Nonetheless, it preserves the desirable feature of giving the defendant requisite notice that he is being
charged with being an habitual criminal.
Under the provisions of what we have called a typical Habitual Criminal Act, the mandatory life sentence imposed on a guilty defendant has
served partially to defeat one of the purposes of the original law, i.e. the
protection of the public from repeated offenders. Juries often hesitate to
bring in a guilty verdict because they reason that the principal crime is
not in itself serious enough to warrant such a punishment, and that by
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 9-111; Bandy v. Hehn, 10 Wyo. 167, 67 P. 979 (1902).
N.Y. Laws 1926, c. 457.
Op. cit. note 4 supra.
State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452 (1921); State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203,
171 P.2d 383 (1946); State v. Kelch, 114 Wash. 601, 195 Pac. 1023 (1921).
England: 6 and 7 Wm. IV, Chap. 11; W. Va. Code Ann. sec. 6131 (1943); Wash.
Rem. and Bal. Code 1903, Ch. 2174.
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convicting the accused of the principal crime they will be, in effect, imposing a sentence of life imprisonment on him. Prosecutors often refrain
from framing indictments and informations under these statutes because
of this difficulty of getting convictions.13 These practical difficulties could
be largely avoided by the adoption of the procedural reform just advocated.
In the alternative, it has been suggested that the mandatory provisions for
punishment be stricken from the habitual criminal statutes, and that they
be replaced by more flexible provisions taking full advantage of indeterminate sentencing, or permitting the courts, prisons, or certain administrative bodies wide discretion in deciding the length of the sentence which
should be imposed. 14
Since society and the courts are slowly coming around to the conclusion that the punishment should not only fit the crime but also the
criminal, and that in framing a penal code one should consider the
aspects of rehabilitation and correction in addition to punishment, it might
be questioned that prior conviction is a sufficient criterion to establish
that a man is a habitual criminal. In England it is necessary to establish
that the defendant was at the time the principal offense was committed
"leading a persistently dishonest and criminal life."' 5 This may be shown
in various ways, prior convictions being persuasive but not conclusive
evidence of it.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Wyoming Habitual Criminal
Act, in its present form, is prejudicial to the defendant, and may defeat the
main purpose for which it was originally intended; further, that it is not in
harmony with present day society's concept of punishment tempered with
rehabilitation because of its inflexible punishment provision and its arbitrary standard for ascertaining the status of habitual criminality. The
Legislature might well consider amending the act along one or more of
the lines suggested.
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COMMISSION OF A SINGLE TORT AS GIVING JURISDICTION
OVER A FOREIGN CORPORATION
In a recent Vermont case the plaintiff sued the defendant, a foreign
corporation, to recover for damages to the planitiff's house allegedly caused
by the negligence of the defendant in re-roofing the dwelling. The action
was brought under a statute giving state courts jurisdiction over a foreign
13 Report of Indiana Committee of Observance and Enforcement of Law, Jan. 5, 1931.
14. Metcalf, Recidivism in the Courts, 26 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 367 (1936).
15. Rex v. Baggot. 4 Crim. App. 67 C.C.A. (1910).

